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Scanning the airwaves, all that could be found was static.  
And then, one minute before the hour, through the disturbance 
came the notes of “Moscow Nights”.  Perhaps elsewhere the Cold 
War was frigid and stale, but here, over high frequency radio, the 
Cold War was hot.  Radio Moscow played a leading role in that hot 
war over the airwaves – just as much as the Voice of America, 
Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty.  Yet, very little has 
surfaced in the West regarding the role of Radio Moscow in the 
Cold War.  My paper works to analyze this significant player in the 
battle between the United States and the Soviet Union.  I explore 
the organization and programming of Radio Moscow and its 
connection to the Soviet Government.  In addition, I seek to 
analyze its reception in the United States and, most importantly, 
how it was used as a vehicle of Soviet foreign policy around the 
world. 
 
Early Broadcasting in Russia (to 1941) 
From a very early time, the leadership of the revolutionary 
Bolshevik party in Russia recognized the importance of mass 
  100 
communication, a point only strengthened after the October 
Revolution of 1917.  Soon after the creation of the Soviet 
Government in Moscow, the Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda was set up to coordinate and control all the media 
outlets in the nation. 1  While the new government recognized the 
importance of newspapers and magazines, they jumped on the new 
technology that could spread their word most effectively to a 
population spread out over 6.6 million square miles. 
Radio would soon have the capacity to spread information 
about health, sanitation, and agriculture, as well as the message of 
the central government across the vastness of Soviet territory.2  
With Lenin’s message of world revolution, radio could spread the 
movement into Europe and Africa.  Within two years of the 
establishment of a Moscow radio laboratory in 1922, ten stations 
were in operation in the Soviet Union.  While stations were 
allowed to be established by organizations and collectives, radio 
broadcasting effectively remained in the hands of the Soviet 
government.3  As the new state evolved, the Soviet leadership 
recognized the need for international broadcasting.  The creation of 
Radio Moscow filled this need. Established in 1929 with French, 
English, and German language services, programming expanded 
with Swedish, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, 
Czech, and Russian services by 1932.4  Like domestic 
programming, Radio Moscow expounded the successes of the 
1917 Revolution and the recent accomplishments of the Soviet 
Government. 
 
Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) 
By the end of the 1930s, the Soviet Union faced new 
challenges on its borders, particularly to the west.  Adolf Hitler’s 
territorial expansion into Austria, Czechoslovakia and even farther 
east was making the Soviet leadership nervous.  The Molotov-
                                                
1 Philo C. Wasburn, Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio 
Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality (Westport: Praeger, 
1992), 1. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
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Ribbentrop Pact kept the Germans at bay until the Nazi invasion of 
June 22, 1941. 
As German forces invaded Soviet territory as a part of 
Operation Barbarossa, they entered a country that had experienced 
great gains in the radio field.  Over 100 broadcast stations were 
found across the country.5  However, the June invasion caught the 
Soviet government by surprise, giving the state’s broadcast 
apparatus little time to join the war footing.  Still, Radio Moscow 
managed to establish broadcasting to German-occupied territories 
in their own languages early in the war.6  The increased 
broadcasting over distances and construction of new, powerful 
stations would serve Radio Moscow well over the war and post-
war years.   
Though reaching occupied territories as well as the 
expanses of Soviet territory with the government’s message was 
important, the Soviet leadership recognized the importance of 
counteracting German radio.  The war of the airwaves was 
characterized by premature declarations of victory, reports of 
atrocities on the opposing side, and accounts of conditions on the 
enemy’s home front.  Early in the war, the Germans took the upper 
hand over the feeble attempts by Radio Moscow to counteract their 
claims.  However, by 1942, Moscow had managed to gain listener 
trust.  As James von Geldern notes, the factors included, “relative 
reliability, the willingness to trust listeners to reach their own 
conclusions, and improved fortunes of war”.7 
Indeed, the Soviets had gained the upper hand.  Though the 
Great Patriotic War left nearly 14% of the Soviet population as 
casualties, it also left the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet state 
in a revitalized condition.  Wartime broadcasting boosted Radio 
Moscow’s staff to thirteen native broadcasters capable of 
producing programming in most European languages.8  The station 
included a strong German language department, particularly useful 
in the coming decades of post-war occupation of Germany.  
                                                
5 James Von Geldern, "Radio Moscow: the Voice From the Center," Culture and 
Entertainment in Wartime Russia, ed. Richard Stites (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1995), 45. 
6 Ibid., 47. 
7 Ibid., 57. 
8 Ibid., 58. 
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Finally, technology had been upgraded, providing Radio Moscow 
with facilities to reach most of the Eurasian continent.  By 1945, 
Radio Moscow was broadcasting in 29 different languages.9 
 
 
Expansion of International Broadcasting during the Early 
Cold War (1945-1965) 
 While Victory in Europe and later Victory in Japan ended 
the shooting war in 1945, another battle was just beginning.  The 
wartime relationship between the Soviet Union and the western 
allies had always been plagued by some mutual mistrust.  This 
mistrust soon escalated as the occupation of conquered territories 
progressed. 
 To meet the escalation of tensions between the Soviet 
Union and the west, Radio Moscow continued to increase its 
broadcast capabilities and target populations.  The first addition to 
Radio Moscow’s language services was Korean in 1946, followed 
closely by Uighur and Mongolian.  The Korean service became 
particularly important with the occupation of the northern half of 
the Korean Peninsula by the Red Army and the beginning of the 
Korean Conflict in 1951.  Language services to the Indian 
Subcontinent and South Asia were also added in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s.10 
 Radio Moscow also expanded many of its preexisting 
language services to serve new requirements.  At the end of the 
1940s, the Arabic service moved from broadcasting 7.5 hours per 
week to 42 hours per week, one of Radio Moscow’s largest.  
Persian language broadcasting increased to 31.5 hours per week in 
1950, and Turkish to 31¼ per week.  European language 
broadcasts also expanded, however, they tended to favor Western 
Europe.  Weekly broadcasts in English expanded to 38 hours, 
French to 28 hours, and German to 55 hours per week.   Italian and 
Finnish language services also experienced modest increases.  
Surprisingly, weekly broadcasts to Yugoslavia were cut nearly by 
half, while broadcasts to Czechoslovakia were completely cut.  
                                                
9 "Radio Moscow in the War Years," Voice of Russia, 2004. 16 Nov. 2006 
<http://www.vor.ru/English/75/program_5.html>.  
10 Bernard Bumpus and Barbara Skelt, “Seventy Years of International 
Broadcasting,” Communication and Society 14 (Paris: UNESCO, 1983): 49. 
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Similarly, the end of the 1940s brought a cut of 10 hours from the 
Mandarin Chinese service to 14 hours per week.11 
 In response to Radio Moscow and other Soviet 
broadcasters, the United States also stepped up broadcasting to 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  By 1956, the Voice of 
America was broadcasting more than 300 hours per week to the 
Soviet Union.  Radio Liberation (changed in 1963 to Radio 
Liberty) was established in 1951 by the United States to broadcast 
to the Soviet Union in Russian and other Soviet languages.  It 
began with a 20-minute Russian program repeated for 12 hours a 
day.  By 1957, it had increased to speaking 17 Soviet languages 
from 11 transmitters.  At the same time, Radio Free Europe began 
speaking to Eastern Europe.  By 1954, it was broadcasting 124¾ 
hours a week to Poland alone.12 
 These increases in broadcasting hours by both sides began 
the Cold War radio battles.  As global crises evolved and other 
nations joined or left spheres of influence, language services and 
their weekly outputs changed to reflect the situation.  The 
developing African independence movements in the late 1950s and 
1960s changed Radio Moscow’s meager African services, adding 
Portuguese and 11 African languages, including Somali, Zulu, and 
Malagasy.  English and French language output for the African 
continent was also increased by the end of the decade.13     
 
Purpose of International Political Broadcasting and Radio 
Moscow 
 In today’s capitalist market, large and small businesses 
recognize the need for a public image and dissemination of 
information about their services.  Many use word of mouth, 
billboards, and radio and television spots to inform potential 
customers.  Likewise, since the beginning of the modern system of 
international politics, nation-states have recognized a similar need 
to create a good public image around the world.  The United 
Kingdom uses the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), not only 
to serve the needs of the domestic population, but also to 
disseminate a British viewpoint over radio, television, and the 
                                                
11 Ibid., 48. 
12 Ibid., 48. 
13 Ibid., 58. 
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Internet to non-British nationals.  Newscasts may cover a story in 
China, unrelated to the British Isles.  However, commentary and 
analysis can come from a British perspective, subtly bringing the 
audience into the British approach. 
 Though highly-skewed to the Western ear, Radio Moscow 
sought to establish the same relationship with the listener during 
the Cold War.  By explaining the Soviet perspective of an issue, 
the audience could be drawn into Moscow’s outlook.  While they 
might not have agreed with the opinion, they would now at least 
understand Moscow’s position as it related to their own.  Thus, the 
Soviet system became less intangible and ever so much more 
rational. 
 The creation of borders and barriers to trade among nations 
prohibits the flow of personal contact and information.  A traveler 
or good must be approved to exit and enter a country through a 
visa or trade regime.  However, radio waves, with the exception of 
jamming and atmospheric phenomena, cannot be stopped at the 
border.  Thus, the medium of radio provides nations with the 
ability to speak to peoples of another state without interaction with 
the second government.  While a government may not be able to 
publish an inflammatory document in another country without 
diplomatic problems, it may be able to broadcast the information to 
the other country without reservation.  Radio can bring 
international relations from the international summit to the level of 
the individual citizen. 
 
Organization and Control of Radio Moscow 
Radio broadcasting originating from the Soviet Union 
operated on a multilevel system.  At the bottom stood local 
broadcasters, followed by stations in the various oblasts and krays.  
At the top stood the central broadcasting system, under which 
Radio Moscow fell. 
In 1961, control over of broadcasting in the Soviet Union 
was held by the State Committee of Radio and Television 
Broadcasting.14  The Committee itself was a direct part of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR, which became Sovmin after 
1946.  According to S.V. Kaftanov, Chairman of the State 
                                                
14 S.V. Kaftanov, Radio and Television in the USSR (Washington: U.S. Joint 
Publications Research Service, 1961), 31. 
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Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, reported in 
1961 that the Committee’s tasks included: illuminating “domestic 
and foreign policies of the Communist Party and of the Soviet 
government,” “introduction of the radio listeners and television 
viewers to the best works of literature, music and to the theatrical 
art of the peoples of the USSR,” and “exposing the anti-national 
essence of bourgeois ideology, morality and reactionary 
propaganda”.15  By keeping the Committee chairman directly 
responsible to the Council of Ministers, the state was able to 
maintain control over all news, educational, cultural, and 
entertainment programming broadcast over the state apparatus, 
including Radio Moscow. 
 
Programming Content: An Hour With Radio Moscow 
While a history of the broadcasting service is important, a 
dissection of a one-hour broadcast also yields great insight into 
Radio Moscow’s role in Soviet policy.  Typically, a few minutes 
before the hour, an interval signal, usually the popular tune 
Moscow Nights, would be broadcast to indicate the beginning of 
programming.  On the hour, the Kremlin chimes would be heard, 
followed by a full news summary.  The news summary would 
usually take into account domestic events beginning with the 
Communist Party, followed by stories from satellite nations, and 
condemnations of events in the capitalist world.  Following the 
news, a feature would be presented, often a musical program or 
commentary on current events.  Topics often included the life of 
the Soviet worker, United States arms policy, or the success of 
farm programs in the Soviet republics.  Musical programs regularly 
highlighted Russian and Soviet composers and artists.16  Multiple 
feature programs were offered throughout the hour, but none 
compared with Moscow Mailbag.  For 40 years, until his death in 
2005, the English-language program was hosted by Joe Adamov 
and featured listener questions ranging from the KGB to the artist 
of a traditional Russian song.  The broadcast would be concluded 
with a recap of various program notes and then the cycle would 
begin again with Moscow Nights. 
                                                
15 Ibid., 31-32. 
16 Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1987), 277. 
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News Broadcasting 
In the early years of the Cold War, as it had before, Radio 
Moscow stuck to a news format.  Gayle Durham Hollander 
described some of the important topics in news broadcasts:   
 
In 1960, Partiinaya Zhizn indicated the following 
major change in procedure:  “The central radio 
stations in Moscow must first of all ensure timely 
broadcasts of important political information, 
effective commentary on domestic and foreign 
events, the organization of various artistic 
programs…Because radio should give the 
population the important news before the 
newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to 
transmit news immediately to central and local 
stations.”17 
 
The “major change in procedure” she describes comes not from the 
content of the radio programming, but rather the shift in 
responsibility for major stories from the newspapers to radio 
stations.  Concerning newscasts, Kaftanov described the materials 
to be found in news bulletins around 1960: 
 
Materials pertaining to the Seven Year Plan for the 
Development of the National Economy of the 
USSR occupy a place of importance in all 
presentations of “The Latest News”, about the 
progress of work towards the fulfillment of that 
plan, materials about how the Soviet people are 
executing the decisions of the Party and the 
government, information on themes dealing with 
political, party, Komsomol, and trade union life.18 
 
News programs generally stuck to the events within the 
Communist Party first, then those stories that exemplified Soviet 
                                                
17 Gayle Durham Hollander, "Recent Developments in Soviet Radio and 
Television News Reporting," The Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1967): 360. 
18 Kaftanov, Radio and Television in the USSR, 41. 
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activities around the world, other socialist movements, and events 
in the Warsaw Pact nations.   
 Though well past the early Cold War years of the 1950s 
and 1960s, the newscast of July 1, 1985 provides evidence as to 
how the Soviet Union portrayed itself over its global mouthpiece.  
Headlines lead with information about the full session of the 
Central Committee, followed by details of the meeting of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.  Next, a story about the 
condemnation of the U.S. ‘Star Wars’ defense plan, a project 
particularly detested by Moscow, by an international group of 
physicians.  Subsequent stories touched upon another mass 
meeting in Greece condemning American deployment of missiles 
to Europe and continuing problems following the Union Carbide 
disaster in Bhopal, India.   
The major global story of the day concerned the release of 
39 American hostages from TWA Flight 847.  However, the only 
remote reference to the story was in Radio Moscow’s description 
of U.S. negotiations with the French concerning terrorism, which it 
described as an attempt at, “military action against a number of 
sovereign nations and national liberation movements”.19   
Likewise, it played down the removal of Grigori Romanov from 
the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, regarded by many 
to be Mikhail Gorbachev’s major rival.  Instead, it stated that he 
was, “retiring on pension on account of his health”.20  In this way, 
news briefings were strictly controlled to follow the official 
government line. 
In addition to hourly newscasts, Radio Moscow presented 
news magazines and special interest commentaries based on 
current and historical news stories.  In the 1985 broadcast, the 
hourly newscast was followed by ’The Way We See It’ A Look at 
the Soviet Union and the World, today devoted to contrasting U.S. 
missile deployment with Soviet policy.21  Later commentaries dealt 
with survivors of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima visiting Moscow 
and thanking the government, “for their tremendous efforts to ease 
world tensions” and the denunciation of the United States’ 
negative attitude toward arms negotiations by a British labor union.   
                                                
19 Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine, 273-274. 
20 Ibid., 278. 
21 Ibid., 275. 
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Jamming 
 In addition to the attention that the Soviet government gave 
to its own international broadcasting, another indication of the 
medium’s importance came in the government’s active jamming 
campaign.  In international broadcasting, the act of jamming refers 
to one station or power deliberately broadcasting on a frequency 
already in use by another station for the purposes of preventing the 
signal from being received.  While Radio Moscow’s signals were 
rarely jammed by other nations, the Soviet Union actively jammed 
the broadcasts of Western stations such as the BBC and the Voice 
of America.  The purpose of this was to prevent Soviet citizens 
from being able to tune in the Western broadcasters, fearing 
“Western cultural infiltration”.22  Indeed, they may have had cause 
to worry: the Voice of America estimated 8 million Soviet citizens 
listened into Western broadcasts. 
 In response to increased broadcasts directed to the Soviet 
Union, a campaign of jamming the Voice of America and the BBC 
from an estimated 150 transmitters within Soviet territory in 1949.  
While this scale of jamming was effective, it was most certainly 
not without cost.  U.S. Government estimates in 1950 indicated 
that the Soviet Union was spending $17.5 million a year on 
jamming, or an amount equal to the Voice of America’s total 
budget.  Indeed, a U.S. diplomat speculated that the Soviets, 
“devoted four times the capital equipment in transmitters and 
monitoring stations and ten times the manpower to block Western 
broadcasts” following the Voice of America’s increased efforts to 
circumvent jamming.23   
 Had the Soviet Union not recognized the role that 
international broadcasting could play in changing domestic public 
opinion (or conversely, the role it could play in changing Western 
public opinion), they would not have invested much needed capital 
in jamming activities from the end of World War II right up until 
1989.  The United States also recognized this importance and used 
it as a way of tying up Soviet resources in jamming and 
international broadcasting.   
                                                
22 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold 
War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin's P, 1997), 33. 
23 Ibid., 36. 
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Reception in the United States 
It is important to remember that broadcasting is a two-way 
exchange: the broadcaster transmits and the listener must listen to 
the signal.  With this in mind, what was the reception of Radio 
Moscow in one of its major targets, the United States?  Don D. 
Smith investigated the impact of Radio Moscow’s broadcasts in 
the late 1960s.  In his article “Some Effects of Radio Moscow’s 
North American Broadcasts”, Smith revealed that there was a 
“sizable audience”.24   
Operating on the theory that Radio Moscow’s 
programming was anti-American and did not meet general 
standards of effective communication, Smith still found that 
Americans who regularly listened to the programs were, none the 
less, influenced by what they heard.  In a previous survey of 
general shortwave radio listening habits, he discovered that 9% of 
the national sample had listened to foreign radio broadcasts within 
the last year, with 6% of the sample having specifically listened to 
political or news programming.25  When those indicating a high 
interest in international affairs were surveyed, the most mentioned 
station was Radio Moscow.26  Though they recognized that the 
information was biased and propaganda-based, they also noted that 
such broadcasts were, “useful in (1) making them more aware of 
what other countries are thinking about the United States, (2) 
giving them additional information about world affairs, and (3) 
telling the other side of the story”.27  The majority of this audience 
was made up of male professionals and those with at least some 
college education.28   
In the case of Smith’s Radio Moscow study, he found that, 
despite the listening population’s biases about the content of 
broadcasts, their direction of opinion consistently changed to favor 
Moscow’s line.  Seventy percent of the experimental group had 
their views toward the Soviet Union and Moscow’s policies 
                                                
24 Don D. Smith, "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American 
Broadcasts," The Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (1970): 541. 
25 Ibid., 540. 
26 Ibid., 543. 
27 Ibid., 545. 
28 Ibid., 544. 
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change for the better, especially those who had held very negative 
views to begin.29  One participant commented that the broadcasts 
made them see that the Soviet Union was not just some, “’monster 
with atomic bombs in each hand; instead they’re human, as 
concerned with human affairs as we are’”.30   
However, in one of his final conclusions, Smith remarked 
that the effectiveness of Radio Moscow broadcasts could not 
completely be attributed to the presentation of information.  
 
The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not 
because of any particular skill in communication, 
but because conditions in our own [American] 
society had led the audience to hold unrealistic 
negative images which, upon actual exposure, were 
clearly refuted for many of the listeners.31 
 
The crux of Smith’s point is that many of the respondents 
were affected by the difference in opinions between Radio 
Moscow and the American domestic media.  As one reply put it, 
“’When they [Radio Moscow] say something that is different from 
what you read in American newspapers you begin comparing, and 
sometimes what they say makes more sense’”.32  Many of those 
who reported an unexpected change for the better in their opinion 
of the Soviet Union based on Radio Moscow broadcasts also 
reported that American media played a role in this change.  Their 
attention to shortwave broadcasts from the Soviet bloc exposed 
them to other sources, which, on occasion, they found to be 
credible or even more reasonable than what the American media 
was saying. 
In terms of strictly technical reception in the United States, 
it is impossible to say how strong signals were received during the 
1950s and 1960s.  Quality of shortwave signals is subject to a host 
of variables, including transmitting power, atmospheric conditions 
(including weather), local terrain, and interference from other 
                                                
29 Ibid.,  546. 
30 Ibid., 549. 
31 Ibid., 550. 
32 Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-Five Years Later," 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 33 (1969): 545. 
  111 
stations on nearby frequencies.  There are indications that Radio 
Moscow’s North American Service was consistently available 
throughout the Continental United States, as reported by various 
newspapers, university researchers, and regular listeners.33 
 While Radio Moscow’s in-house surveys have not yet 
surfaced, the audience research of the major American 
broadcasters has.  The period studied by Smith was just the 
beginning of larger-scale audience research by the Voice of 
America and Radio Liberty.  Methodology, and a system by which 
to interview travelers from the Soviet Union, was only seriously 
worked out by 1970.  Until then, Soviet travelers in the West were 
interviewed on an ad hoc basis, only allowing basic inferences 
about listening habits.34  However, in the period between 1972 and 
1990, the Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (SAAOR) 
unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was able to interview 
upwards of 50,000 Soviet travelers in the West and more than 
25,000 legal immigrants.35 
 The first audience quantification using the system was 
between 1970 and 1972, in which SAAOR estimated that the 
Voice of America reached 23% and Radio Liberty 11% of the 
Soviet adult population weekly.  By 1980, the VOA was estimated 
to reach 15% and Radio Liberty, 8%.36  These numbers remained 
consistent throughout the 1980s and 1990s for the VOA.  
However, Radio Liberty experienced a climb from 7% in 1980 to 
10% in 1985.  This was followed by a sharp increase in listeners in 
1989 to around 17% of the adult Soviet population.37  This is due 
to the cessation of Soviet jamming of the station that had been 
constant for decades.  Overall, RFE/RL research of listening habits 
found that audiences were dominated by urban males between ages 
30 and 50, concentrated around Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltics, 
and Trans-Caucuses. 
                                                
33 Edna C. Sorber, “An Analysis of the Persuasion Used in Radio Moscow's 
North American Service” diss. Univ. of Wisconsin, 1959, 139. 
34 R. Eugene Parta, Discovering the Hidden Listener: an Empirical Assessment 
of Radio Liberty and Western Broadcasting to the USSR During the Cold War 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007), 2. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
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 While these estimates have been disputed by some, the 
statistics still show that there was a far greater audience to Western 
radio stations such as the Voice of America and Radio Liberty in 
the Soviet Union than there was for Soviet broadcasts in the United 
States.  Between 1970 and 1970, SAAOR found that the VOA was 
reaching around 23% of the Soviet adult population.  However, 
Smith found that only 9% of the U.S. population listened to 
international radio overall, and not one specific station. 
 
Conclusions 
What conclusions can be drawn about Radio Moscow’s use 
in the early Cold War?  Perhaps the most important thing about 
Radio Moscow’s international services was the value placed on 
them by the Soviet Government.  Even without a budgetary 
measure of value, it is apparent that Radio Moscow was a vital part 
of the Soviet broadcasting apparatus from the mid-1930s.  By 
1932, Soviet radio was broadcasting abroad in 11 languages, rising 
to 29 by the close of the War.  Officials in the Kremlin saw that 
shortwave broadcasts were a way to spread Soviet opinion and 
views on international affairs and to counteract the influence of the 
capitalist system.   
The link between the Soviet Government and Radio 
Moscow is indisputable – the station was operated by the 
government under the State Committee on Radio and Television 
Broadcasting, within the central radio broadcasting system.  News 
broadcasts, a staple of Radio Moscow’s programming since the 
Great Patriotic War, were still subject to pre-broadcast censorship 
by the government and concentrated on party and government 
news. 
Finally, though the audience for Radio Moscow’s 
broadcasts was rather insignificant in the United States, the station 
did manage to reach some of its goals.  Though listeners reported 
that they did not experience a change of heart regarding the Soviet 
Union, they did report that some of their overall opinions had 
changed.  In the end, the overall listenership to Radio Moscow was 
relatively small, seeing as the total nationwide audience for all 
international political broadcasting in November of 1966 equaled 
2% of Americans, or about 2 million people. While listeners 
reported one of their top favorites to be Radio Moscow, the 
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station’s listener base would be significantly less than 2 million, 
and thus not drastically altering overall U.S. public opinion.  This 
is in sharp contrast to the Soviet audience for Radio Liberty and 
the Voice of America.  However, Radio Moscow’s value outside of 
the United States is relatively unknown.  Many throughout the 
world, particularly in the developing world, tuned in regularly to 
Moscow’s broadcasts. 
Despite a relatively small group of listeners in the United States 
and the role of censorship played in listeners’ opinions, the role of 
Radio Moscow in the USSR’s foreign policy apparatus cannot be 
underplayed.  The attention paid to Radio Moscow by the central 
government and its rapid development through the 1930s and 
1940s provides compelling evidence for its value to the state.  The 
station’s broadcasts provided invaluable insight into Soviet life for 
Western governments and the general public.
